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TORT LAW-PRODUCT LIABILITY-MANUFACTURER'S DUTY TO PRO-
VIDE NECESSARY SAFETY EQUIPMENT-EFFECT OF PURCHASER'S RE-
QUEST THAT SAFETY EQUIPMENT BE REMOvED--The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that under Penn-
sylvania law where a knowledgeable purchaser of equipment in-
structs the manufacturer to remove a standard safety device prior
to the equipment's delivery the manufacturer is liable for injuries
resulting from the lack of the safety device even where the equip-
ment was used by an experienced operator.
Hammond v. International Harvester, 691 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1982).
James Hammond worked as a tenant farmer on a farm owned by
Lois Peck and managed by John Newlin.' Newlin purchased, for
use on the farm, an International Harvester Front End Skid
Loader, Series 3300, which normally comes equipped with a a roll
over protective structure (ROPS) and side screen? The ROPS is
designed to prevent an operator of the loader from falling out of
the driver's seat or leaning out of the operator's area.$
Newlin, however, requested that the dealer remove the ROPS
prior to delivery because the tractor would have difficulty moving
through a low barn door with the ROPS attached, and the dealer
complied.4 Hammond operated the tractor for approximately eight
months until, on April 18, 1977, a fatal accident occurred while he
and his son, Ron, were attempting to put a metal leg stand under a
conveyor machine. 5 Hammond drove the tractor up to a hill where
the conveyor was located and lifted the machine with the tractor's
bucket while Ron put the support legs under the conveyor.' As
Ron placed the legs under the machine, Hammond stood up on the
tractor's knee guard, possibly to get a better view, and slipped. He
fell across the side of the tractor, inadvertently struck its foot
pedal and caused the boom arm to be released. 8 The arm fell sud-







8. Id. The loader bucket is attached to the front end and may be raised or lowered by
the operator's maneuvering of the boom control pedals. The boom extends parallel to the
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denly, striking Hammond and crushing his upper torso." He died
while pinned beneath the boom.10 The manufacturer conceded
that, had the ROPS been attached, Hammond would not have
been in a position to be crushed by the boom arm and the accident
would not have occurred."
Hammond's wife, Ruth, as administratrix of his estate, and in
her individual capacity, instituted a diversity action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on a
products liability theory claiming that the tractor delivered to the
Peck farm was defective in design because it lacked a ROPS and
side screens."' The case was tried before a jury and, at the end of
the trial, defendant moved for a directed verdict."3 Judge Van
Artsdalen denied the motion, effectively ruling that under the al-
leged facts the tractor was unreasonably dangerous."' The judge
then submitted special interrogatories to the jury to determine if
the facts were true as alleged.' 5 The jury responded in the affirma-
tive and found that the tractor was defective at the time of its sale
and delivery.' The defendant appealed and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.1
7
The court of appeals began its analysis with a discussion of five
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions which represent the Com-
monwealth's modern application of product liability law.' 8 Writing
for a unanimous court, Judge Rosenn first noted that Webb v.
Zern"'9 was the case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
operator's seat from the rear of the tractor to the bucket at the front, and, according to the
operator's manual, is elevated or lowered by the boom control pedal which controls the hy-
draulic system of the boom and bucket on the loader. The foot control pedals permit opera-
tion of the boom and bucket simultaneously while driving with the forward and reverse
control levers and the speed with which the boom moves depends upon the movement of the
foot control pedals. Id. at 648 n.2.
9. Id. at 648.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 648-49.
12. Id. The plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania, while defendant International Har-
vester is a Delaware Corporation doing business in Pennsylvania. The accident occurred in
Pennsylvania and both parties'agreed that Pennsylvania law governed. Id. at 648 n.1.
13. Id. at 650.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The trial was on the issue of liability only since both parties had previously
agreed to an amount for damages. Id. at 648.
17. Id. at 648. The appeal was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Circuit Judges Garth
and Rosenn. Id. at 647. A rehearing and a rehearing in banc was denied on November 19,
1982. Id. at 646.
18. Id. at 649. See infra text accompanying notes 19-33.
19. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). See infra note 67.
Vol. 22:10851086
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adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 0 as
the law of the Commonwealth. Judge Rosenn then reviewed
Bartkewich v. Billinger2 2 which held, two years later, that a lack of
proper safety devices can constitute a defective design for which
there may be recovery.23 Judge Rosenn noted that the Bartkewich
rule has been applied frequently by federal courts in diversity ac-
tions when applying Pennsylvania law.2 4 Judge Rosenn also re-
ferred to Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.," a 1974 decision
abolishing Pennsylvania's horizontal privity requirement.
2 6
It was the plurality opinion of Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp.,27 the court observed, which supplied a broad definition of
the concept of defectiveness, holding that defective conditions are
not limited only to defects in design or manufacture, but extend to
every element necessary to make a product safe for its intended
use. 28 The court noted that Berkebile rejected the notion that the
phrase "unreasonably dangerous" refers in any way to the manu-
facturer's exercise of due care.29
Finally, the court discussed the 1978 unanimous opinion of the
20. The pertinent parts of section 402A read:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his property, if,. . . (b) it is expected
to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
21. 691 F.2d at 649.
22. 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968). See infra note 76.
23. 691 F.2d at 649. See 432 Pa. at 354, 247 A.2d at 605.
24. 691 F.2d at 649. See Heckman v. Federal Press Co., 587 F.2d 612 (3d Cir. 1978);
Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259 (3d Cir. 1977).
25. 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). See infra note 82.
26. 691 F.2d at 649. In Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court stated:
Today . . . a manufacturer by virtue of section 402A is effectively the guarantor of
his product's safety. Our courts have determined that a manufacturer by marketing
and advertising his products impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use.
We have decided that no current societal interest is served by permitting the manu-
facturer to place a defective article in the stream of commerce and then to avoid
responsibility for damages caused by the defect. He may not preclude an injured
plaintiff's recovery by forcing him to prove negligence in the manufacturing process.
Neither may the manufacturer defeat [a breach of warranty] claim by arguing that
the purchaser has no contractural relation to him. Why then should the mere fact
that the injured party in a products liability action is not himself the purchaser deny
recovery?
457 Pa. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907 (citations omitted).
27. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). See infra note 85.
28. 691 F.2d at 649.
29. Id. at 650. See 462 Pa. at 94, 337 A.2d at 899.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Azzarello v. Black Brothers0
which, the court stated, clarified the opinion in Berkebile by elabo-
rating on the definition of unreasonably dangerous.3 1 According to
the court, Azzarello indicated that the phrase is a term of art used
when the judge determines that the risk of loss should be placed
on the supplier after referring to the social policy underlying Penn-
sylvania product liability law.3 2 The court stated that the trial
court first must determine whether the imposition of strict liability
would be proper based on the plaintiffs allegations; only after an-
swering this question in the affirmative may it then turn the case
over to the jury for a determination as to whether the alleged facts
are true. 3
Judge Rosenn then examined the facts before the court in light
of Salvador, Berkebile, and Azzarello."4 He stated that since a
ROPS is standard equipment on the Series 3000 tractor and its
purpose is to protect the operator from serious injury, the lack of
the device is strong evidence that the tractor was not equipped
with all of the elements necessary for safe use.35 Under the hold-
ings of Azzarello and Berkebile, Judge Rosenn noted, the exclusion
of this safety device was sufficient to render the tractor legally de-
fective.3 6 Also, Judge Rosenn continued, the inclusion of the ROPS
as standard equipment reflects the manufacturer's determination
that this device is economically feasible, not inconvenient to use
and a necessary element for safety.3 7 He emphasized that the legal
defect caused by the lack of the ROPS is not cured even though
the purchaser requested its removal.
3 8
The court then reviewed recent Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA) regulations which were promulgated sev-
eral months prior to the manufacture of the tractor but were not
30. 480 Pa. 547, 319 A.2d 1020 (1978). See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
31. 691 F.2d at 650.
32. Id. See Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
33. 691 F.2d at 650. The court also noted that Berkebile further limited the definition
of defectiveness to products which are unreasonably dangerous, thus ensuring that "manu-
facturers of innately dangerous products, such as knives and whisky, are not automatically
[held] responsible for all the harm that such things do in the world." Id. (quoting Berkebile,
462 Pa. at 95, 337 A.2d at 899, (quoting Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in Cali-
fornia, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23 (1966))).
34. 691 F.2d at 650.






effective until six months later.39 The court indicated that, al-
though not applicable to the instant case, the OSHA regulations
are now effective and provide strong support for the proposition
that a tractor, operated under identical circumstances to those
which killed Hammond, does not possess every element necessary
to make it safe unless equipped with a ROPS.'0
The court stated that any lack of reasonableness or prudence by
the dealer in accepting an order for a tractor without a ROPS is
irrelevant since defectiveness is solely a function of the delivered
condition of the product.41 Similarly, the court reasoned, Ham-
mond's negligence is equally irrelevant since he did not personally
request that the tractor be delivered without a ROPS and, there-
fore, any risk which his superiors might have assumed cannot be
imputed to Hammond since he had no influence regarding the
purchase of the tractor.42
Judge Rosenn then distinguished Taylor v. Abbe'3 from the pre-
sent situation.44 In Taylor, Judge Rosenn explained, a parts sup-
plier for a pebble mill offered to sell a mill owner a safety device,
but the offer was refused.45 Subsequently, an employee whose in-
jury could have been prevented had the safety device been in place
sued the parts supplier on the theory that the supplier was respon-
sible for the unreasonably dangerous condition of the machinery.'6
The trial court found for the plaintiff, but the court of appeals re-
versed, reasoning that the supplier neither designed nor manufac-
tured the mill. 47 Judge Rosenn found that Taylor was not applica-
ble since International Harvester both designed and manufactured
the defective tractor, thus, it was wholly responsible for the condi-
tion in which the tractor was delivered.48 Accordingly, the court of
39. Id. 29 C.F.R. § 1928.51(b)(1) (1983) states: "A roll-over protective structure
(ROPS) shall be provided by the employer for each tractor operated by an employee." Id.
40. 691 F.2d at 651.
41. Id. at 652.
42. Id. The court noted that it did not reach the question of whether the outcome
would have been different if Hammond had personally ordered the tractor without the
ROPS and that it did not consider the issue of whether Hammond assumed the risk by
voluntarily operating the tractor with the ROPS removed since appellant did not raise the
issue on appeal. Id. at 652 n.7.
43. 516 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1975).
44. 691 F.2d at 652.
45. Id. See 516 F.2d at 146.
46. 691 F.2d at 652. See 516 F.2d at 147.
47. 691 F.2d at 652. See 516 F.2d at 147-48.
48. 691 F.2d at 652. An additional point raised by the defendant was that an expert
witness who testified for the plaintiff was not qualified under rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Id. at 652-53. The court disagreed and noted that the witness was qualified
1984 1089
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appeals affirmed the decision of the district court finding the trac-
tor deficient under section 402A.49
The initial proposal for strict product liability standards came in
the 1944 decision of Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,0
where Justice Traynor, in a concurring opinion, recommended the
elimination of a showing of negligence in product liability cases.6"
At that time a person injured by a defective product was required
to prove all of the necessary elements of negligence before he could
successfully recover damages.52 He noted, however, in many cases
it was simply impossible for plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
manufacturer had failed to exercise reasonable care since the nec-
essary proof was carefully guarded proprietary information.
53
Justice Traynor stated that this proposed concept is dictated
also by public policy which requires that the expense of an injury
be assumed by the product's manufacturer and then distributed
among all of its consumers as a cost of doing business." He also
stated that liability should be imposed where it will most effec-
tively reduce the hazards which are inherent in defective prod-
ucts.55 He indicated that these philosophies were consistent with
the changing industrial climate in which localized facilities are re-
placed by centralized operations.56 In such cases, consumers can no
longer have the close relation with manufacturers that they previ-
ously enjoyed, but rather, must rely heavily on reputations and
trademarks which are created by planned marketing efforts.
Therefore, since the consumer's buying decisions are no longer
based on his personal knowledge of the manufacturing process, he
should no longer be required to present evidence which reflects the
level of care employed by the producer."
In 1961 the American Law Institute accepted this idea in Tenta-
based on his knowledge and experience rather than academic training. The court com-
mented that qualification of experts is within the discretion of the trial court and its rulings
are reversible only for abuse of discretion. Id. at 653. See Moran v. Ford Motor Co., 476
F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1973).
49. 691 F.2d at 653.
50. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
51. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 463, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
1090 Vol. 22:1085
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tive Draft Number Six of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.5 9
The proposal recommended the adoption of a new section recog-
nizing strict liability of sellers for claims arising out of the con-
sumption of food products.60 Then in April, 1962, Tentative Draft
Number Seven expanded this coverage to include such products as
chewing gum, tobacco, drugs, clothing, soap, and other items which
involved intimate bodily contact irrespective of any nutritional
value."'
The next step came in 1963 when Justice Traynor, writing this
time for the majority, again addressed this issue in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.62 This case adopted, as the law of Cali-
fornia, two necessary elements for a cause of action in strict prod-
uct liability: (1) demonstration by the plaintiff that he was injured
as the result of an unknown defect in the design or manufacture of
a product, and (2) proof that the product was being used for its
intended purpose at the time of injury."' Although prior decisions
had embodied similar concepts, the courts generally continued to
adhere to some finding, however tenuous, of a contract or war-
ranty.Y Greenman, which eliminated such requirements, noted
that laws which were developed to meet the needs of commercial
transactions could not properly govern cases involving injuries
from defective products since such laws do not effectively serve the
purpose for which strict liability is imposed. 5
Finally, in May of 1964, the American Law Institute expanded
the provisions of Tentative Draft Number Seven to include strict
liability coverage for all products. This resulted in the 1965 publi-
cation of the currently operative section 402A.6
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted section 402A as
the law of the Commonwealth on June 24, 1966 in Webb v. Zern.17
59. Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 918 (5th Cir. 1964).
60. Id. at 918-19.
61. Id.
62. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897; 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
63. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
64. Id. at 63, 337 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). Webb involved a plaintiff who was injured when
a beer keg, purchased from the defendant beer distributor, exploded. On that same day the
supreme court also decided the case of Miller v. Prietz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966)
which concerned the death of a child whose injury was caused by a defective vaporizer
which sprayed hot water onto the decedent. In a concurring and dissenting opinion by Jus-
tice Roberts it was stated that while the majority of the court appeared to favor the adop-
tion of section 402A into Pennsylvania law they did not believe that Miller presented the
1984 1091
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Webb, a short opinion by Justice Cohen, summarily vacated a
favorable judgment, of a defendant manufacturer, without any re-
view of the trial court's reasoning.18 The supreme court stated that
the dispositive issue was not the disputed areas of negligence law,
as argued by both parties, but rather the newly developing laws
governing the liability of one who produces or markets a defective
product for use or consumption." The court cited Miller v. Prietz
70
as an accurate representation of the history and policies surround-
ing the publication of 402A, noting that it reflects a modern atti-
tude and adopted it as the law of Pennsylvania.7 ' Accordingly, the
Webb court remanded the case for a new trial and entered an order
permitting the plaintiff to file an amended complaint consistent
with the provisions of 402A."
In a vigorous dissent in Webb, Chief Justice Bell stated that
such a radical departure from established precedent should come
by legislative action rather than "judicial ukase. ' 17 He emphasized
that the uncertainty and confusion had resulted from past deci-
sions which had swept broadly and impliedly overruled prior, heav-
ily relied upon case law.7' But irrespective of this opposition, the
decision in Webb firmly established the provisions of 402A as the
applicable Pennsylvania law in product liability cases. Despite its
far reaching effects, however, the lack of specificity of the Webb
decision provided little guidance regarding the limitations which
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would impose upon claims for re-
lief under the provisions of section 402A.75
Four subsequent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions helped
to clarify some of the questions the court left unanswered in Webb,
beginning in 1968 with Bartkewich v. Billinger2" Bartkewich es-
proper factual situation. 422 Pa. at 415, 221 A.2d at 336. (Roberts, J., concurring and
dissenting).
68. 422 Pa. at 426-27, 220 A.2d at 854.
69. Id.
70. 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966).
71. 422 Pa. at 427, 220 A.2d at 854.
72. Id. at 427, 220 A.2d at 855.
73. Id. at 428-29, 220 A.2d at 855-57.
74. Id. at 429-30, 220 A.2d at 855-57.
75. The short opinion adopted section 402A without any suggestions regarding the
proper determination of the Restatement's interpretations. The court simply adopted the
language of the section without any reference even to the official comments. Id. at 427, 220
A.2d at 854.
76. 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968). This case involved a factory worker who was
injured when a glass breaker, which he was operating, became jammed. The plaintiff in-
serted his hand into the operating mechanism of the machine to remove a piece of glass and
his hand became entangled in the mechanism. The court denied recovery based on plain-
1092 Vol. 22:1085
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tablished two major points. First, the court held that a lack of
safety devices can constitute a defective design under 402A." This
result follows axiomatically from the basic principle of strict prod-
uct liability which places the primary responsibility for a product's
safety upon the manufacturer, the party in the best position to de-
termine when safety devices will be effective in preventing
injuries. 8
The second major point outlined in Bartkewich deals with the
effectiveness of two independent defenses: product misuse and as-
sumption of the risk. As early as Greenman, courts had recognized
that recovery in strict liability must be predicated upon plaintiff's
use of a product in the manner for which it was intended. 79 Inde-
pendent of this, it is equally well established that an injured party
cannot voluntarily proceed in the face of a known danger and still
seek recovery for any associated injuries.8 0 The Bartkewich court,
however, confused these separate defenses.81 A careful reading of
Bartkewich raised the question of whether Pennsylvania courts
would recognize the sufficiency of evidence supporting only one of
these defenses or whether the court was attempting to indicate the
necessity of all of the elements of both defenses as a bar to recov-
ery. The opinion of the court was not clear.
Pennsylvania's refinement of strict product liability continued in
the 1974 case of Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., s2 which
tiff's misuse of the product and assumption of risk. Id. at 352-56, 247 A.2d at 604-06.
77. 432 Pa. at 354, 247 A.2d at 605. See generally Dickerson, Products Liability: How
Good Does a Product Have to Be, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence
of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 822 (1962).
78. This concept was first proposed by Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). While virtually
all jurisdictions which have adopted strict product liability support the proposition that
responsibility should be placed on the party in the best position to prevent injuries, the
courts have been split as to who is in the best position. See infra note 114.
79. See supra note 63. See also Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the
Law of Tort (pt. 3), 53 U. PA. L. REV. 337, 343 (1905); Holford, The Limits of Strict Liabil-
ity for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. Rav. 81, 89 (1973); RESTATEmENT (SEc-
OND) OF ToRTs, § 402A, comment n.
80. See, e.g., Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 932 (1974), in which the court refused to consider a strict liability claim upon the
finding that the plaintiff assumed the risk. See also, Heil v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976), in which the court considers extensively the limitations on such a defense
in product liability cases.
81. 432 Pa. at 354-56, 247 A.2d at 605-06. The court began by talking about product
misuse and then shifted to a discussion of the known danger to which plaintiff exposed
himself. While plaintiff's action could have fallen under both defenses, the court was not
careful to distinguish the two. Id.
82. 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). In this case, the plaintiff was injured when a
1984 1093
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abolished horizontal privity restrictions."3 Salvador noted that this
was dictated both by the public policy which justifies the imposi-
tion of responsibility for harm on the manufacturer, due to the
high value placed upon the protection of human life, and the es-
tablishment of strict product liability principles which recognize
that manufacturers impliedly represent that their products are safe
for their intended use. '
The 1975 plurality opinion of Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter
Corp.8 5 was the first real attempt by the Pennsylvania high court
to articulate, with some detail, the various elements necessary to
establish a cognizable claim in strict product liability." To this
end, Berkebile chose the California approach as adopted in the
1972 case of Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Co. 87 Cronin abandoned the
traditional requirement, first established in Greenman, that the
plaintiff bear the burden of proving that the injury was caused by
an unreasonably dangerous defect.8 8 Berkebile was quite clear in
this matter: "Strict liability requires, in substance, only two ele-
ments of requisite proof: the need to prove that the product was
defective, and the need to prove that the defect was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries." 89 The Berkebile court stated that
while comment i to section 402A requires the plaintiff to prove an
unreasonable danger this tends to impose a negligence oriented el-
ement into strict liability concepts.90 Similarly, the court held that
a plaintiff does not have to demonstrate any foreseeability on the
boiler, purchased by his employer, exploded. The manufacturer defended on the ground
that, since the employee had no contractual relation with the manufacturer, horizontal priv-
ity was lacking. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affumed the decision of the superior
court which reversed the decision of the trial court. Id. at 26-27, 319 A.2d at 904-05.
83. Id. at 32-33, 319 A.2d at 907-08.
84. Id. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907.
85. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). Berkebile involved a pilot who was killed when
the engine on his helicopter failed during climbout because it ran out of fuel. The evidence
indicated that the crash would not have occurred had the pilot either filled the fuel tank
before take-off or engaged the helicopter's autorotation system within a prescribed time pe-
riod after engine failure. The dispute centered around whether or not the pilot's contribu-
tory negligence, in failing to fill the fuel tank, would relieve the manufacturer from liability
even though the helicopter was defective since it failed to carry an adequate warning con-
cerning the time period necessary to engage the autorotation system. Id. at 91-92, 99-100,
337 A.2d at 897-98, 901-02.
86. The court stated "that the lack of clearly articulated standards has generated
much misinterpretation." Id. at 92, 337 A.2d at 898.
87. Id. at 96, 337 A.2d at 900. See Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972).
88. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
89. 462 Pa. at 93-94, 337 A.2d at 898.
90. Id. at 95, 337 A.2d at 899.
1094
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defendant's part concerning the circumstances causing an injury,
since forseeability, along with unreasonable danger, connotes a
standard based on the manufacturer's lack of due care."'
The Berkebile court noted that consideration of these factors by
juries -would only be confusing and tend to alter their decisions
based on factors not embodied within strict liability.92 The court
stated that once a defective product condition is shown, the manu-
facturer is then responsible for all consequences, irrespective of the
manufacturer's exercise of due care. 3
Finally, Berkebile concluded with a discussion of the defenses of
product misuse and assumption of the risk.9 4 As with Bartkewich,
the court mixed the concepts within the same general discussion
but in Berkebile it was made clear that they are independent de-
fenses. While most of the discussion in Berkebile centered on the
specific facts of the case, the court was able to clarify the differ-
ences between closely related principles of product misuse, contrib-
utory negligence and assumption of the risk through the use of
readily distinguishable examples." Since a requisite to recovery
under section 402A is an injury caused by a defective product be-
ing used in its intended manner, by definition, any misuse of the
product would bar recovery.96 Also, if an injured party willingly
proceeded to use a product despite a known danger, it has been
held that this would, likewise, prevent any recovery by the
plaintiff. 7  .
The more difficult determination must be made when a plaintiff
who has no knowledge of any defect or danger uses a product in its
intended manner, but through some level of negligence causes a
latent defect to become operative. Should his contributory negli-
gence bar recovery? Berkebile reasoned that under the principles
of strict product liability, it is the product itself which is under
scrutiny.'8 To interject an evaluation of due care, either by plain-
tiff or defendant, would shift the analysis away from the product
91. Id. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900.
92. Id. at 96-97, 337 A.2d at 900.
93. Id. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900.
94. Id. at 97-100, 337 A.2d at 900-02.
95. Id.
96. See supra note 79.
97. See supra note 80.
98. Throughout the entire opinion, the Berkebile court emphasized that negligence
factors should not enter into the decision process in strict product liability cases, but rather,
the product itself must be examined to determine whether it is safe for its intended use. 462
Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893.
1984 1095
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and move it towards the independent subject of negligence.99
If no deliberate action such as misuse or assumption of the risk
can be shown, then, irrespective of any level of negligence by the
plaintiff, the defect itself is still a superseding factor since the in-
jury could not possibly have occurred without it. 00 Therefore, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has judicially determined that under
such circumstances, it is the manufacturer who must assume the
full burden of any injury to the plaintiff.' 0' The distinctions that
the court has made concerning these three defenses, and the asso-
ciated results, are consistent with the generally accepted pro-
nouncements of courts in other jurisdictions.
0 2
Since Berkebile was only a plurality opinion, its precedential au-
thority was under challenge. 03 Any question regarding its viability,
however, was laid to rest with the 1978 decision in Azzarello v.
Black Brothers.'"' In that case, the court reviewed the history of
product liability law with the special emphasis placed on the pro-
priety of a jury instruction which incorporates the term "unreason-
99. Id. at 94, 337 A.2d at 899.
100. The court stated that liability in strict product liability is not precluded because
of plaintiff's contributory negligence. Id. at 100, 337 A.2d at 901. Since, in Berkebile, the
contributory negligence of the injured party (failure to fill the fuel tank) caused the latent
defect to become operable (failure to provide adequate warnings concerning the pilot's oper-
ation of the helicopter after engine failure), and since the accident would not have occurred
had the defect not been present, the court effectively ruled that the defect was a superced-
ing cause of the accident, since the injured's actions do not legally affect the outcome of the
case. Id. at 98-100, 337 A.2d at 901.
101. Id. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900.
102. See supra notes 79 and 80. See, e.g., Reed v. Carlyle & Martin, Inc., 214 Va. 592,
202 S.E.2d 874 (1974); McCully v. Fuller Brush Co., 68 Wash. 2d 675, 415 P.2d 7 (1966).
Comment n. to section 402A reads:
n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this section deals is not
based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict
liability cases (see 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a de-
fense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the
form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably pro-
ceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of as-
sumption of risk, is a defense under this section as in other cases of strict liability. If
the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and neverthe-
less proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
103. In Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 538
F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976), the federal court refused to follow Berkebile since it was only a
plurality opinion. A similar result was reached in Bair v. American Motors Corp., 535 F.2d
249 (3d Cir. 1976).
104. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
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ably dangerous."105 Azzarello adopted the Berkebile approach that
such terminology incorrectly implies that negligence standards,
rather than strict product liability standards, govern defective
product damage claims and, therefore, must not be used in a jury
charge.' 6° The opinion also noted that the decision of whether or
not a product is unreasonably dangerous must rest with the judge
because the variety of factors which must be balanced against ex-
isting social policy would be too complicated for lay jury
determination.
0 7
The precise issue in Hammond was whether a party may be de-
nied recovery for injuries caused by a defective product if the pur-
chaser specifically requested that the manufacturer remove a
safety device which would have prevented the injury.' Under the
holding in Azzaretlo, it was first necessary for the trial judge to
rule, as a matter of law, whether the tractor was delivered by the
defendant to the purchaser with an unreasonably dangerous defect,
based on the plaintiff's allegations.109
The trial judge, in his determination, used the four factors on
which the Hammond court ultimately relied." 0 Since no Pennsyl-
105. 480 Pa. at 550, 391 A.2d at 1022. The injured plaintiff, in that case, was operating
a coating machine which was manufactured by the defendant. The defendant joined the
plaintiff's employer as an additional defendant to the action, claiming that its negligence
was responsible for the injury rather than the coating machine's design. Because of this joint
defense in both negligence and strict liability, the judge was forced to devise a jury instruc-
tion which covered both defenses yet clearly distinguished these concepts. In formulating
this instruction, the judge repeatedly used the term "unreasonably dangerous" which was
extracted from the text of section 402A. The use of this term formed the basis of the appeal.
Id. at 549-50, 391 A.2d at 1022.
106. Id. at 558-60, 391 A.2d at 1026-27.
107. Id. at 557-60, 391 A.2d at 1026. The decision mentioned some general considera-
tions which must be addressed by the trial judge; however, the opinion is devoid of any
specific guidelines which would tend to provide some level of uniformity across the Com-
monwealth. Thus, while setting down a basic procedural rule, i.e., the trial judge must deter-
mine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, the court has simply shifted such a
determination from the jury to trial judge but failed to provide guidance as to how the judge
must base his decision. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
108. 691 F.2d at 648.
109. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. This approach was cited in Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), and subsequently adopted in Berkebile. Az-
zarello then affirmed Berkebile. Generally, the Cronin approach has been criticized. See,
e.g., Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of a Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974);
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of a Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Comment, 14
DuQ. L. REV. 25 (1975).
110. First, the inclusion of a ROPS as a standard, factory equipped safety device is
indicative of tle manufacturer's acknowledgement of the tractor's inherent safety deficien-
cies and an implied admission that its inclusion does not lower the machine's utility nor
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vania law regarding the specific issue under consideration existed,
the trial judge was required to formulate his decision based on a
prediction of how the Commonwealth's highest court would rule
under similar circumstances.'11 To this end, the trial court had
available the general Pennsylvania policies as developed from
Webb through Azzarello, and some specific case law developed in
other jurisdictions which had considered similar issues.1
2
International Harvester argued that Bowman v. General Mo-
tors,11s Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.," 4 and Biss v. Ten-
make it cost prohibitive. 691 F.2d at 651. Second, the accepted primary purposes of the
ROPS are to prevent an operator from being crushed in a rollover accident, and to confine
him to the zone of safety provided by the vehicle's cab if he becomes dislocated. Id. at 648.
Third, OSHA regulations requiring the use of a ROPS at all times, except when physically
impossible, demonstrate the awareness by safety experts of the hazards involved when a
tractor is operated with the ROPS removed. Id. at 651. And fourth, the admission by the
defendant that the accident would not have occurred had the ROPS been installed. Id. at
648-49.
1J 1. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). This was a diversity of
citizenship case which concerned the proper interpretation of existing Vermont law. Elabo-
rating on the procedure to be followed when precedential authority was non-existent or in
serious doubt, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, stated "As long as there is
diversity jurisdiction, 'estimates' are necessarily often all that federal courts can make in
ascertaining what the state court would rule to be its law." Id. at 209.
112. In Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972), the New Jersey
Supreme Court reasoned that the installation of safety devices was the primary responsibil-
ity of the manufacturer and not delegable to the consumer. The Fifth Circuit specifically
rejected this approach in Gordon v. Niagra Machine and Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182 (5th
Cir. 1978), in which the court stated that the purchaser was in a better position to deter-
mine which safety devices were most appropriate for the purposes intended. An intermedi-
ate approach was taken by the Third Circuit in Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d
Cir. 1978), in which the court indicated that factors such as trade custom, expertise, and
practicability must govern delegability of safety device installation. It is interesting to note
that Verge was also a Third Circuit opinion which addressed a similar issue as in Ham-
mond. However, since Pennsylvania law was not in question, the court took a different ap-
proach than in Hammond; one which strikes more of a balance between competing parties
in the determination of liability on account of a lack of necessary safety equipment. 581
F.2d at 387.
113. 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Bowman concerned an automobile passenger
who was severely injured when the gas* tank of a 1966 Oldsmobile burst into flames after the
car was struck from behind by another vehicle. Since the case was decided before Azzarello,
the trial judge did not have the benefit of its holding which prohibited jury determination of
unreasonable danger, and which emphasized that a manufacturer is effectively the guarantor
of its products safety. Based on its prediction that jury determination of unreasonable dan-
ger would be upheld by the supreme court, it permitted the jury to make this decision and
the jury found for the defendant. Id. at 245-46.
114. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974). Dreisonstok involved a plaintiff who was injured
when her Volkswagen microbus collided with a telephone pole. The plaintiff claimed her
injuries were enhanced because the vehicle failed to provide sufficient energy absorbing
materials in the passenger compartment. The decision was based on Virginia law and the
judge balanced the utility of the vehicle's design against an associated reduction in safety
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neco115 all supported its position, but the court of appeals dis-
agreed. 1 6 Judge Rosenn noted that Bowman and Dreisonstok both
concerned instances where a manufacturer balanced safety, cost
and convenience and then compromised safety in favor of the re-
maining factors, while Biss involved a product whose manufacturer
delegated the balancing process to the purchaser, who was then
free to accept or decline optional safety equipment." Judge
Rosenn stated that the instant case was distinguishable since In-
ternational Harvester first balanced safety, cost, and convenience,
determined that the optimal product would maximize safety
(through the inclusion of a ROPS), and then fully disregarded this
evaluation by honoring the purchaser's request that the ROPS not
be installed."'
Since these decisions were not on point with Hammond, the
court of appeals was forced to extrapolate its specific opinion only
from the general Pennsylvania law. One of these policy statements
came from Salvador, and was reaffirmed in both Berkebile and
Azzarello:
Today ... a manufacturer by virtue of section 402A is effectively the guar-
antor of his product's safety. Our courts have determined that a manufac-
turer by marketing and advertising his products impliedly represents that it
is safe for intended use. We have decided that no current societal interest is
served by permitting the manufacturer to place a defective article in the
stream of commerce and then avoid responsibility for damages caused by
the defect.'1
Based on this language, and the four evidentiary items presented
by the plaintiff, it is reasonable to conclude that the judge cor-
rectly found that the tractor contained an unreasonably dangerous
defect. In Berkebile a plurality of the supreme court explained
that the "guarantor" language used by the Salvador court does not
refer to absolute liability since products such as knives and whis-
key, which are inherently dangerous despite perfection in manufac-
and determined that the vehicle was not unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 1071-75.
115. 64 A.D.2d 204, 409 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978), motion for leave to appeal denied, 46
N.Y.2d 711, 416 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 389 N.E.2d 841 (1978). That case concerned a logger who
was killed when the loader he was operating went off a road and collided with a telephone
pole. It was contended that his injuries would not have occurred had the loader been
equipped with a ROPS. The court denied recovery based on the fact that the manufacturer
offered the ROPS for sale to the employer of the deceased but the purchase was declined.
Id. at 205-08, 409 N.Y.S. at 875-77.
116. 691 F.2d at 651 n.6.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 457 Pa. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907.
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ture and design, are not defective and fall outside the scope of
strict product liability.1 0
In Hammond, the defect present in the tractor could hardly be
considered inherent and non-correctable since, by the defendant's
own admission, the injury to Hammond would not have occurred
had the accepted safety device been installed at the time of sale.1" '
Therefore, the manufacturer failed to meet the standard set in
Salvador by not providing a product which was safe for its in-
tended use and as a guarantor of its products safety, International
Harvester thus became liable for the damages due to Hammond's
injury.
In its defense, International Harvester failed to supply sufficient
authority to support its legal contentions. First, it stated that the
language in Salvador was nothing more than a summary of strict
product liability principles and, as such, should not be construed
literally. 2 ' The defendant attempted to support this proposition
by citing an excerpt from Taylor v. Abbe 2 3 which stated that a
manufacturer need only make an offer of sale of a safety device to
a purchaser to be relieved of liability under section 402A.1 4 This
argument, however, does not consider a fundamental distinction
from Hammond. In Taylor, the defendant was only a supplier of
parts for machinery which it never manufactured. 25 Under the
holding in Salvador, though, only manufacturers of products can
be held liable for damages due to a defect in the original prod-
uct. 2 6 Therefore, the verdict for the defendant in Taylor was not,
as International Harvester contended, based on a Pennsylvania
policy which relieves manufacturers from liability if its offer of the
sale of a safety device is refused by the purchaser.
2 7
The defendant also contended that the opinion in Azzarello pro-
vided for a negligence-based test when evaluating a product under
strict liability standards. 28 International Harvester attempted to
120. 462 Pa. at 95, 337 A.2d at 899.
121. 691 F.2d at 648-49.
122. Brief for Appellant at 5, Hammond v. International Harvester, 691 F.2d 646 (3d
Cir. 1982).
123. 516 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1975). See Brief for Appellant at 6, Hammond.
124. 516 F.2d at 148. See Brief for Appellant at 6, Hammond.
125. 516 F.2d at 146. See also 691 F.2d at 652. Appellee noted also that Taylor was
decided before Azzareflo and, therefore, the viability of its holding may be suspect. Brief for
Appellee at 8, Hammond.
126. 457 Pa. at 30, 319 A.2d at 907.
127. 691 F.2d at 652.
128. Brief for Appellant at 8, Hammond.
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support its theory by noting some footnotes in Azzarello which
contained excerpts from articles authored by Dean Wade. 129 Next,
the defendant abruptly shifted emphasis to the case of Bowman v.
General Motors,13  which also quoted Dean Wade.13' While the
comments in Bowman may be considered somewhat favorable to
International Harvester's position, their contents were substan-
tially different from the comments cited in Azzarello.'12 Appar-
ently the defendant was attempting to demonstrate, by induction,
that the acceptance of one comment by Dean Wade in Azzarello
was an implied adoption of Dean Wade's comments in Bowman.1
33
The final contention of the defense was that the jury charge in
Azzarello virtually guarantees the plaintiff a directed verdict in its
favor, since the jury is not permitted to evaluate the level of unrea-
sonable danger in a product."" This argument also fails since,
before the case is turned over to the jury, the judge must first
make this determination as a matter of law. 3' Thus, the legal deci-
sion regarding the level of unreasonable danger of a product has
already been made before the jury deliberates and, therefore, it
129. Id. The footnotes cited in Azzarello (480 Pa. 547, 554, n.5-6a 391 A.2d 1020, 1024,
n.5-6a (1978)) were taken from Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.T.J.
13 (1965), and express the general distinctions between strict liability, absolute liability, and
negligence.
130. 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
131. Brief for Appellant at 8, Hammond. The comments cited came from Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability-Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973), and were
cited in Bowman at 427 F. Supp. at 244, 245, n.18. Wade's comments tend to support a
balancing approach, similar to that taken by the Third Circuit in Verge, 427 F. Supp. 234
(E.D. Pa. 1977). This approach examines a variety of factors to determine which party is in
the best position to provide adequate safety devices. Compared to the Azzarello standards,
which shift the bulk of the burden to the manufacturer, such an approach would be more
favorable to International Harvester's position.
132. Bowman also involved a federal court's interpretation of product liability law in
Pennsylvania; however, since this decision was prepared before Azzarello, the federal court
could not rely on the principles of Berkebile since as a plurality decision of the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court, it carried no precedential weight. See supra note 103.
133. While this inductive reasoning approach was not specifically cited in appellant's
brief, one could draw no other conclusion based on the wording and construction of this set
of paragraphs. See Brief for Appellant at 8, 9, Hammond. The appellant relied heavily on a
comment by Dean Wade, quoted in Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 557, 391 A.2d at 1026, which de-
scribes the factors involved in the judicial determination of unreasonable danger. See Brief
for Appellant at 8, Hammond. See also Wade, supra note 131, at 840. However, while the
comment analogizes the process used to determine whether a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous to that used in determining whether an actor is negligent, it is only the process of
balancing which is compared and not the elements of a cause of action. The comment spe-
cifically notes that the procedure is "similar" to negligence but not the same as negligence.
134. Brief for Appellant at 11, 12, Hammond.
135. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
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need only decide whether the allegations of the plaintiff, upon
which the judge based his decision, are true.136 Furthermore, the
Azzarello jury charge is substantive law decided by the unanimous
action of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As a court in a diver-
sity, the Hammond court was precluded from altering established
law.1
3 7
The Hammond court noted that it was intentionally reserving
judgment on two issues which were related to the facts of the
case. 13 8 First, the court stated that it would not consider whether
Hammond had assumed the risk of his injury by having operated
the tractor with the ROPS removed since the defendant did not
raise this question on appeal.13 9 Under Berkebile, assumption of
the risk must be proved by a showing that the injured party was
aware of the specific defect causing the injury and voluntarily
chose to use the product despite this knowledge of danger. 140
Berkebile further requires that any finding of assumption of the
risk must be based on an injured's subjective knowledge and not
the objective "reasonable man" standard.' 4' Also, such subjective
knowledge must be affirmatively proved by the defense. 42
Hammond, as an experienced farmer, was most likely aware of
the dangerous properties possessed by the tractor. Additionally,
however, it must be proved that an injured party fully compre-
hended and appreciated the specific danger involved. Herein lies
the stumbling block. Given the unusual set of events that led to
the ultimate injury, it would have been extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for the defendant to have proven Hammond's subjec-
tive awareness that such events could have occurred. This, how-
ever, is exactly what Berkebile requires. 43
A second related issue, which the Hammond court refused to
consider, was whether its decision would have been altered had
Hammond himself specifically requested the tractor be manufaca-
tured without the ROPS.'4 4 Irrespective of who made the request
to eliminate the ROPS, the Salvador principles of strict product
136. Id.
137. 691 F.2d at 650 n.4.
138. Id. at 652 n.7.
139. Id.
140. 462 Pa. at 100, 337 A.2d at 901.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 100, 337 A.2d at 902.
143. Id. 337 A.2d at 901. The court stated: "A finding of assumption of the risk must
be based on the individual's own subjective knowledge."
144. 691 F.2d at 652 n.7.
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liability would still consider the product unreasonably dangerous
and place liability upon the manufacturer unless he could prove
some affirmative defense.
145
The defense of assumption of the risk still remains inapplicable
since Hammond's subjective knowledge of the specific danger
would be in no way improved simply because he, rather than his
supervisor, personally requested that the ROPS be removed. Fur-
ther, no contention was made and none of the evidence suggests
that the tractor was misused.1 6
The Hammond decision, while not forging any new law, provides
a clear, consumer oriented interpretation of Pennsylvania's strict
product liability standards for future federal diversity cases. By
viewing the Salvador policy as the basic foundation of the Com-
monwealth's law, the Hammond court has firmly established that
the primary responsibility for product safety will remain with the
manufacturer, even under situations when the consumer himself
requests less protection. As a federal prediction of state law, how-
ever, it will be interesting to note whether the Pennsylvania state
courts, when confronted with similar circumstances, choose to
adopt this liberal approach or restrict the level of protection manu-
facturers must provide when following the direct order of the
purchaser.
William A. Behare
145. This follows from the concept that a defective condition is a function of the prod-
uct itself. See Salvador, 457 Pa. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907.
146. This would leave International Harvester in a position to defend only on the basis
of Hammond's contributing negligence. Berkebile, however, held that any suggestion of neg-
ligence, whether caused by plaintiff or defendant, would not be permitted under Pennsylva-
nia law since the fundamental principles of strict product liability look to the product and
not to someone's negligence. 462 Pa. at 94-97, 337 A.2d at 899-900. Thus, neither of these
two arguments, had they been presented by International Harvester, would have affected
the ultimate outcome of the decision.
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